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Introduction 
The success of achieving the social goals of Payments for
Environmental Services (PES)  programmes, i.e. reduction of
poverty, depends directly on the equitable distribution of
benefits to poor mountain communities, who are the primary
custodians and managers of environmental services. Although
PES programmes are not designed for poverty reduction, they
can create substantial synergies when programme design is
well thought through. Recent literature indicates that in
general PES programmes are not very sensitive to equity
issues and are governed in such a way that may even
exacerbate existing inequalities and trigger social tensions
(Karr 2002; Miranda et al. 2003). It is therefore important to
investigate the governance and equity aspects of PES, which
are critical for sustainable development and environmental
conservation (WCED 1987). 
Equity in PES can be understood from three perspectives:
equity in access, equity in decision-making and equity in
outcome (Corbera et al. 2007). Equity in access refers to the
governance mechanism which determines an individual
participant’s access to environmental resources, including
land and forest. Equity in decision-making refers to the
procedural fairness of the PES framework, which ensures that
all sections of the community have an equal voice in decision
making processes. Equity in outcomes refers to the
distribution of cash and in-kind benefits across participants.
In view of this, this paper briefly examines the challenges of
governance mechanisms of PES in relation to poverty and
equity. 
Challenges to developing pro-poor PES programmes 
Despite the theoretical potential for PES to benefit the rural
poor, many programmes present serious obstacles to the
inclusion of poor households. As most environmental services
are land-based, a growing body of literature suggests that
the governance mechanisms of the majority of PES schemes
favour larger and wealthier landowners and provide little
benefit to poor and landless people. A study in one Costa
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Rican PES programme, for instance, found that about two
thirds of the participants were large landholders who had
more than 80 ha land, and only one third small landholders
who had less than 10 ha (Miranda et al. 2003). Similarly,
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) state that PES programmes
can increase incentives for powerful groups to take control of
additional land resources, particularly when land tenure is
insecure, thereby aggravating inequality. In this way, the
livelihoods of the landless poor, women, and herders, many
of whom depend on gathering non-timber products from
forests, might also be affected if PES conditions limit their
access to forested land (Kerr 2002). 
In cases where environmental stewards or users are excluded
from access to forest resources (e.g. ban of grazing or non-
timber forest product use) they have to be compensated to
a degree that they are not worse off than before. Property
rights as well as access and tenure issues are at the core of
such problems, and must be considered in the design of
equitable compensation schemes. Agricultural wage
labourers are also likely to lose out from land diversion
programmes with extensification components, which reduce
labour demand and wages (Zilberman et al. 2008). 
As PES is basically a market-based approach, it needs special
attention to make it work for the poor. A few key challenges
are briefly summarised below:
• Identifying providers of environmental services. As most
of the environmental services are land based, there is
the danger of being land-owner biased in shaping
compensation schemes. The poor depend often on the
use of public or community land, but contribute
considerably to environmental services. 
• Tenure security. In many parts of the world, including the
Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region, many indigenous
peoples and ethnic minorities have traditionally no
individual property rights to land, water, and forest
resources. However, payment is generally determined
based on land ownership. The challenge is to develop
policy options to provide equitable rewards in cases
where property rights are not secured. 
• High opportunity costs of participation. Compliance in
PES schemes sometimes requires participants to restrain
from other economic activities such as grazing, fodder
fuelwood collection, tillage practices and other
traditional resource uses. Due to lack of alternative
livelihood options, poor families cannot afford to
participate in PES programmes as they cannot give up
traditional economic activities. 
• High transaction costs. PES schemes demand community
meetings, negotiation of contracts, contributions to
baselines and monitoring studies from the local people.
These transaction costs can become a considerable
burden on poor families and they may opt to be excluded
from the scheme.
• Lack of credit, start-up funds, and other support
services. In order to comply with the requirements of PES
programmes, land users often have to change farming
and other land-use practices, requiring significant
investments or bridging funds for foregone yields, new
material, training, and lost income during the transition
period. Covering these costs is particularly difficult for
poor families, who typically lack credit and cash savings. 
Options for improving equity and governance 
Despite these challenges, there is considerable hope that PES
programmes can be made more pro-poor through designing
appropriate institutional mechanisms, thereby ensuring
equitable, efficient and sustainable functioning. Policies
relating to PES are emerging in some countries to address the
ongoing challenges and issues. 
Though cash contribution might be low, PES can provide poor
and/or marginalised upland communities with a platform to
organise themselves in a way that enhances social capital
and amplifies the call for access to resources, better justice
and equity. Compared to command and control policies for
environmental conservation such as establishing reserve
forest, national parks, banning timber and non-timber forest
products collection, PES can be more inclusive. An additional
potential advantage of PES schemes is in providing relatively
stable income relative to other sources that may allow
smaller farms, more vulnerable to risk, to receive benefits.
Institutional arrangements can be developed to improve the
provision of poor people’s access to resources, access to
participation and access to the rewards of PES programmes.
Because of high diversity of social and ecological systems, it
is not possible to identify a single institutional design which
will work best in all circumstances. Attention should
therefore be paid to designing institutional mechanisms in
such a way that the poor can participate and influence the
decision making process as well as outcomes. 
Property rights significantly influence the design and
performance of PES. Policy options can be developed to
provide appropriate property rights to people who are using
and managing such resources. Until secured property rights
are granted by the national government, institutional
innovation can provide usufruct benefits to participants. In
order to reduce the high transaction cost, provision may be
made to allow groups of small farmers to collectively join
the PES programme. Reliable intermediaries can also play a
significant role in reducing transaction costs and facilitating
designs and negotiations for community-based PES. Options
must also be developed to finance upfront start-up costs
through microfinance programmes, potentially following the
model of the Grameen Bank for financing self-employment. 
Conclusions 
Ensuring the flow of environmental services and rewarding
the providers of such services are at the core of PES systems.
They are not created per se to reduce poverty. However,
most of the areas providing environmental services are in
marginalised regions (many mountainous areas) with
widespread poverty. Without including poverty sensitive
aspects in PES schemes there is a great danger of challenging
the long-term environmental benefits. Equity between and
within societies is a central pillar of sustainable
development. Tools to ensure pro-poor outcomes include:
ensuring equitable access to land, ensuring land tenure
systems, devising special support to the poor to participate
in the schemes and linking PES more effectively to the
benefits of other development programmes. 
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